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I. INTRODUCTION

Companies facing the loss of a laptop or a compromised server
have long waged battles on several fronts: investigating the source of the
breach, identifying potentially criminal behavior, retrieving or
replicating lost or manipulated data, and putting better security in place.
As recently as seven years ago, the broader consequences of a data
breach were largely deflected from the party on whose resource the data
resided and instead rested essentially on those whose data was
compromised. Today, however, with the patchwork quilt of domestic
data breach statutes and penalties, most companies forging "unto the
breach" would consider paying a ransom worthy of King Henry to avoid
the loss of its consumers' identities through theft or manipulation.
The cost to businesses of responding to data breaches continues to
rise. According to the Ponemon Institute, the average cost of data
breaches to the businesses it surveyed increased from $6.65 million in
2008 to $6.75 million in 2009. 3 The per-record cost of the data breaches
experienced by the companies it surveyed was $202 in 2009, only $2
more per record more than the average in 2008 but a $66, or 38% overall
increase since 2005. 4 The most expensive data breach in the 2009
Ponemon survey was nearly $31 million; the least expensive was
$750,000.5 In confronting a data breach, a company has to contend with
a multitude of issues: the costs of replacing lost equipment, repairing the
breach, and thwarting a potentially criminal act. Some specific

3. Ponemon Inst., 2009 Annual Study: U.S. Cost of Data Breach, 14 (Jan. 2010), availableat
http://www.encryptionreports.com/costofdatabreach.htm (last visited Apr. 22,2010).
4. Id. at 12.
5. Id. at 14.
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industries have their own privacy laws. For example, financial firms
must contend with the reporting requirements associated with the federal
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 6 and health care companies face broad
reporting requirements under the new HITECH Act.7 Across the
broader economy, however, attorneys and companies worry most about
a thicket of data breach notification statutes enacted by forty-five states
and the District of Columbia. These statutes expose law firms and their
clients to conflicting time limits, reporting requirements, fines, and
potentially millions of dollars in penalties and civil liability-not to
mention reputational risk. The forty-six data breach notification statutes
vary widely from state to state and, most critically, focus not on the
location of the breach or where the company is incorporated, but on the
residence of the victim.8 Therefore, a company facing a data breach
must comply with the state laws of each of its affected consumers. A
company's multi-state or Internet presence only extends the potential
web of specific time limits and other often conflicting requirements for
notifying consumers.
This Article addresses the legal, technological, and policy issues
surrounding U.S. data breach notification statutes and recommends steps
that state and federal regulatory agencies should take to improve and
harmonize those statutes. Part I of this Article provides background on
the data breaches that gave rise to the enactment of notification statutes.
Part II addresses the varying definitions of "personal information" in the
state statutes-the data that is protected by the statute and whose breach
must be revealed to consumers. Part III analyzes how states define the
data breach itself, particularly whether states rely on a strict liability
standard, on a risk assessment approach, or on a model that blends
elements of both in determining how and when companies have to notify
consumers of a breach. Part IV discusses the time limits companies
face, penalties for non-compliance, litigation under the statutes, and state
enforcement of the statutes. Finally, Part V presents specific
recommendations for the state legislatures and enforcement agencies and
for Congress, as well as for companies facing data breaches.

6. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6801-6809 (West 2010).
7. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 260 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 17932 (West 2010)).
8. See infra Part 1.
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II. BACKGROUND 9

Data breach statute fever began in 2002 after a California state
database, which contained the social security numbers and other
personal information of more than 250,000 state employees, was
compromised.' ° The breach was not discovered for a month and
affected employees were not notified for several weeks after that." This
breach-and the way it was handled-led the California legislature to
enact the country's first data breach notification statute later that year.12
In February 2005, ChoicePoint, a commercial data broker, announced
that it had unwittingly sold personal information regarding 145,000
individuals to a group of people engaged in identity theft. 13 The
company later stated that the breach had actually occurred and had been
uncovered in September 2004, five months before ChoicePoint had
alerted the victims in California pursuant to the California statute. Then,
significantly, victims in other states were not notified, because no legal
mandate required notification. This strict compliance with the letter of
the law became a public relations nightmare for ChoicePoint when nonCalifornia victims found out they had been omitted from the notice.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) subsequently sued
ChoicePoint for not having reasonable procedures to screen prospective
subscribers, for turning over consumers' sensitive personal information
to subscribers whose applications raised obvious "red flags," and for
making false or misleading statements about its privacy practices.' 4 In
2006, ChoicePoint agreed to pay the FTC $10 million in civil
penalties-a record amount-and agreed to make $5 million available to
consumers in restitution. 5 The following year the company settled with

9. The Privacy Law Blog maintained by Proskauer Rose LLP contains links to most of the
statutes cited here. See Proskauer Rose LLP, List of State Breach Notification Laws (2009),
http://privacylaw.proskauer.conm/2009/07/articles/security-breach-notification-l/list-of-state-breachnotification-laws/.
10. See, e.g., Anthony D. Milewski Jr., Compliance with CaliforniaPrivacy Laws: Federal
Law Also Provides Guidance to Businesses Nationwide, 2 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 19 (2006),
availableat http://www.lctjournal.washington.edu/Vol2/a0l9Milewski.html.
11. See id.
12. See id. CAL. CtV. CODE §§ 1798.81.5-.83 (West 2010).
13. See News Release from the Federal Trade Commission, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security
Breach Charges; to Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress (Jan. 26,
2006), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
14. United States v. Choicepoint Inc., No. 106-CV-00198 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 30, 2006)
(complaint), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/0523069complaint.pdf
15. United States v. Choicepoint Inc., No. 106-CV-00198, slip op. (N.D. Ga. Feb. 15, 2006),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/stipfinaljudgment.pdf.
See also News
Release from the Federal Trade Commission, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; to

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol4/iss2/2

4

Lesemann: One More Unto the Breach

2010]

ONE MORE UNTO THE BREACH

forty-four state attorneys general to resolve allegations that ChoicePoint
had failed to adequately
maintain the privacy and security of consumers'
16
personal information.
17
A flood of disclosures similar to ChoicePoint's soon followed,
and in 2005, ten states enacted data breach notification statues.' 8
Seventeen states followed suit in 2006,19 another nine in 2007,20 five in

Pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress (Jan. 26, 2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.shtm (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
16. News Release from the National Association of Attorneys General, 44 Attorneys General
Reach
Settlement
With
ChoicePoint
(May
31,
2007),
http://www.naag.org/44_attomeysgeneral-reach_settlementwith-choicepoint.php
(last visited
Apr. 22, 2010). The forty-four states that participated in the settlement are Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. Id.
17. See
Privacy
Rights
Chronology
of
Data
Clearinghouse,
Breaches,
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2010).
18. The ten states to enact data breach notification statutes in 2005 were Arkansas, 2010 Ark.
Leg. Serv. § 4-86-107 (West); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-103 (2010); Florida, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 817.5681 (West 2010); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912 (West 2010); New
York, N.Y. GEN. Bus. Law § 899-aa (McKinney 2010); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
75-65 (West 2010); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-02 (2010); Tennessee, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-18-2107 (West 2010); Texas, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.053 (Vernon 2010);
and Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010 (West 2010).
19. The seventeen states that enacted statutes in 2006 are Arizona, ARtZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
44-7501 (2010); Colorado, COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716 (West 2010); Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-701b (West 2010); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51-105 (2010), amended
by Act of Apr. 6, 2010, 2010 Idaho Sess. Laws 170 (amending existing law relating to disclosure of
personal information to provide for application to city, county, and state agencies; to provide that
certain entities and individuals shall notify the office of the Attorney General in the event of certain
breaches of security; to clarify that certain reporting requirements shall continue to apply to state
agencies; and to provide for violations and penalties); Illinois, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/10
(West 2010); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-3-I (West 2010); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 51:3074 (2010); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1348 (2010); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 325E.61 (West 2010); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704 (2010); Nebraska, NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-803 (LexisNexis 2010); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.220 (West
2010); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (West 2010); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1349.19 (West 2010); Pennsylvania, 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2303 (West 2010); Rhode Island, R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-3,-4 (2010); and Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98 (West 2010).
20. The jurisdictions were: the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3852 (LexisNexis
2010); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487N-2 (LexisNexis 2010); Kansas, KANS. STAT. ANN. §
50-7a02 (2010); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.72 (West 2010); New Hampshire, N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:20 (West 2010); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.604 (West 2010);
Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-202 (West 2010); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435 (2010);
and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-502 (2010).
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2008,21 and three in 2009,22 bringing the total number of states enacting
data breach notification laws to forty-six.
After ChoicePoint, each data breach notification statute passed by a
state was designed to provide specific protection to that state's residents.
California's statute, for example, provides that "[i]t is the intent of the
legislature to ensure that personal information about California residents
is protected. 23 Similarly, the statute's disclosure requirements are
focused on California residents:
Any person or business that conducts business in California, and that
owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information,
shall disclose any breach of the security of the system following
discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to any
resident of California whose unencrypted personal information was, or
is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized
24
person.

The other forty-five statutes also have focused on their own
residents in enacting statutes that have varied requirements for
investigating and disclosing data breaches, some with significant
monetary penalties. 5 Thus, under these statutes, it is the resident of the

21. The jurisdictions were: Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.2 (West 2010); Maryland, MD.
CODE ANN., CoM. LAW § 14-3504 (West 2010); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, §
3 (West 2010); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (West 2010); and West Virginia, W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 46A-2A-102 (West 2010). Oklahoma also passed a substantial revision to its statute.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 163-64 (West 2010).
22. The jurisdictions were: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2010), Missouri, Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 407.1500 (West 2010), and South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (2010).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5.
24. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.82(a).
25. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010 (2009); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501(L)(4) (2009);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105(a)(1) (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716 (d)(1) (West
2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-701b(b) (West 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-102 (a)
(2009); D.C. CODE § 28-3852(a) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(1)(a) (West 2009); GA.
CODE. ANN. § 10-1-912 (West 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-2(a) (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§
28-51-104(5) (2009), § 28-51-105; 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/10 (2009); IND. CODE ANN. §
24-4.9-3-1 (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.1-2 (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02(a)
(2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3074(a) (2009); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504 (West
2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 3 (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.72
(West 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61 (West 2009); Mo. REV. STAT. § 407.1500.2 (West
2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704(1) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-803 (2009); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 603A.220 (West 2009); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:19(V)
(2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163(12)(a) (West 2009); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa.2
(McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §75-65 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-02
(2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19(A)(1)(a) (West 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 16364 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.602; 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2302 (West 2009); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-3 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-
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victim-and not the location of the company or the breach-that
controls the notification requirements. As a result, a company facing a
data breach in which the victims are spread across the country-a near
certainty today, especially with the Internet providing virtual locations
across the globe-could face multiple, inconsistent requirements and
harsh penalties for failing to comply.
III. PERSONAL INFORMATION DEFINED

A.

The CaliforniaModel

Most states have modeled their data breach statutes after
California's 2002 groundbreaking statute. California's statute requires
notification to individuals if, as the result of a breach in a company's
computer security, an individual's "personal information" is
compromised. 26
California's initial statute defined "personal
information" as a person's first name or first initial and his or her last
name in combination with any one or more of the following pieces of
data, when either the name or the data elements are not encrypted or
redacted: social security number; driver's license number or state
identification card number; account number, credit, or debit card
number, in combination with any required security code, access code, or
password that would permit access to an individual's financial account.27
In 2007, California added two additional elements to the definition
of personal information: medical information and health insurance
information. 28 These amendments became effective January 1, 2008. In
California, as in all except three states with data breach notification
statutes, "personal information" is defined to exclude information that is
publicly available.29
2107(b) (West 2009); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.103 (Vernon 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. §
13-44-202(l)(a) (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2430(2) (2009); VA. Code Ann. § 18.2-186.6
(West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(1) (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A2A-101(6) (2009); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 134.98 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. 40-12-501(a) (2009).
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2009).
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(e).
28. Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, A.B. 1298. 2007-699 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv.
1298 (Deering), codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(e)(4)-(5) (West 2010).
29. ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.590(5) (West 2010) ("[Records of personal information] do[) not
include publicly available information containing names, addresses, telephone numbers, or other
information an individual has voluntarily consented to have publicly disseminated or listed."); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. AN. § 44-1373.01(3) (2010). Alaska's Confidentiality of Personal Identifying
Information Statute does not apply to "[d]ocuments or records that are recorded or required to be
open to the public pursuant to the constitution or laws of this state or by court rule or order, and this
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article does not limit access to these documents or records." Id. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110103(8)(B) (West 2010) ("[Records of personal information] do[] not include any publicly available
directories containing information an individual has voluntarily consented to have publicly
disseminated or listed, such as name, address, or telephone number ....); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 6-1-716(1)(d)(II) (West 2010) ("'Personal information' does not include publicly available
information that is lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, or local
government records or widely distributed media."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-70lb(a) (West
2010) ("Personal information does not include publicly available information that is lawfully made
available to the general public from federal, state or local government records or widely distributed
media."); D.C. CODE § 28-3851(3)(B) (2010) ("[T]he term 'personal information' shall not include
publicly available information that is lawfully made available to the general public from federal,
state, or local government records."): HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-1 (2010) ('Personal information'
does not include publicly available information that is lawfully made available to the general public
from federal, state, or local government records."); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/5 (West 2010)
('Personal information' does not include publicly available information that is lawfully made
available to the general public from federal, State, or local government records."); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 24-4.9-2-10 (West 2010) ("The term [personal information] does not include information that is
lawfully obtained from publicly available information or from federal, state, or local government
records lawfully made available to the general public."); IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.1 (West 2010)
("'Personal information' does not include information that is lawfully obtained from publicly
available sources, or from federal, state, or local government records lawfully made available to the
general public."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01(g)(3) (2010) ("The term 'personal information' does
not include publicly available information that is lawfully made available to the general public from
federal, state or local government records."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3073(4)(b) (2010)
('Personal information' shall not include publicly available information that is lawfully made
available to the general public from federal, state, or local government records."); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1347(6) (2010) ("'Personal information' does not include information from 3rd-party
claims databases maintained by property and casualty insurers or publicly available information that
is lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state or local government records or
widely distributed media."); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3501(d)(2) (West 2010) ("'Personal
information' does not include: (i) Publicly available information that is lawfully made available to
the general public from federal, State, or local government records; (ii) Information that an
individual has consented to have publicly disseminated or listed; or (iii) Information that is
disseminated or listed in accordance with the federal Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 1 (West 2010) ('Personal information'
shall not include information that is lawfully obtained from publicly available information, or from
federal, state or local government records lawfully made available to the general public."); MiNN.
STAT. ANN. § 325E.61(f) (West 2010) ("'[Plersonal information' does not include publicly
available information that is lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, or
local government records."); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.1500(9) (West 2010) ("'Personal information'
does not include information that is lawfully obtained from publicly available sources, or from
federal, state, or local government records lawfully made available to the general public .... );
NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-802(5) (2010) ("Personal information does not include publicly available
information that is lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, or local
government records."); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.040 (West 2010) ("The term [personal
information] does not include the last four digits of a social security number or publicly available
information that is lawfully made available to the general public."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359C:19(IV)(b) (2010) ("'Personal information' shall not include information that is lawfully made
available to the general public from federal, state, or local government records."); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:8-161 (West 2010) ("Records [of personal information] do[] not include publicly available
directories containing information an individual has voluntarily consented to have publicly
disseminated or listed."); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa(b) (McKinney 2010) ('Private
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information' does not include publicly available information which is lawfully made available to the
general public from federal, state, or local government records."); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-65
(West 2010) ("[P]ersonal information shall not include electronic identification numbers, electronic
mail names or addresses, Internet account numbers, Internet identification names, parent's legal
surname prior to marriage, or a password unless this information would permit access to a person's
financial account or resources."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19(A)(7)(b) (West 2010):
"Personal information" does not include publicly available information that is
lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, or local
government records or any of the following media that are widely distributed:
(i) Any news, editorial, or advertising statement published in any bona
fide newspaper, journal, or magazine, or broadcast over radio or television;
(ii) Any gathering or furnishing of information or news by any bona
fide reporter, correspondent, or news bureau to news media described in
division (A)(7)(b)(i) of this section;
(iii) Any publication designed for and distributed to members of any
bona fide association or charitable or fraternal nonprofit corporation;
(iv) Any type of media similar in nature to any item, entity, or
activity...
Id.; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 162(6) (West 2010) ("The term [personal information] does not
include information that is lawfully obtained from publicly available information, or from federal,
state or local government records lawfully made available to the general public ....); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 646A.602(11)(c) (West 2010) ('Personal Information' [d]oes not include
information, other than a Social Security number, in a federal, state or local government record that
is lawfully made available to the public."); 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2302 (West 2010) ("The term
'Personal Information' does not include publicly available information that is lawfully made
available to the general public from Federal, State or local government records."); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-13-510(D) (2010) ("The term [personal information] does not include information that is
lawfully obtained from publicly available information, or from federal, state, or local government
records lawfully made available to the general public."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 (West
2010) ("'Personal information' does not include publicly available information that is lawfully
made available to the general public from federal, state, or local government records."); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-44-102(3)(b) (West 2010) ('Personal information' does not include information
regardless of its source, contained in federal, state, or local government records or in widely
distributed media that are lawfully made available to the general public."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §
2430(5)(B) (2010) ('Personal information' does not mean publicly available information that is
lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, or local government records.");
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (West 2010) ("The term [personal information] does not include
information that is lawfully obtained from publicly available information, or from federal, state, or
local government records lawfully made available to the general public."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 19.255.010(6) (West 2010) ("'[P]ersonal information' does not include publicly available
information that is lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, or local
government records.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2A-101(6) (West 2010) ("The term [personal
information] does not include information that is lawfully obtained from publicly available
information, or from federal, state or local government records lawfully made available to the
general public."); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.97(e)(1) (West 2010) ('Personal information' means...
data.., not generally considered to be public knowledge."); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98(1)(c):
"Publicly available information" means any information that an entity reasonably
believes is one of the following: 1. Lawfully made widely available through any
media. 2. Lawfully made available to the general public from federal, state, or
local government records or disclosures to the general public that are required to
be made by federal, state, or local law.
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Other State Variations

Some states include additional elements in the definition of
"personal information" beyond the California model. For example, the
Iowa, 30 Nebraska, 31 and Wisconsin, 32 data breach notification statutes
include unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, retina, or iris images
in the definition. North Carolina33 and North Dakota 34 expand on the
California model to include an employee's digital signatures.
New York takes a different approach. The statute simply-and
sweepingly-defines personal information as "any information
concerning a natural person which, because of name, number, symbol,
mark or other identifier, can be used to identify that natural person," plus
the individual's social security number, driver's license number (or nondriver identification card number), account number, credit or debit card
number, PIN, or other necessary code.3 5
in Alaska,36
It is also worth noting that the data breach statutes
41
4
0
39
8
3
Hawaii, 37 Indiana, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin
include a breach of written as well as electronic data within the scope of
their laws.
IV. DEFINING A DATA BREACH

The forty-six statutes define a "data breach" on a continuum from a
strict liability standard to a risk-based approach. Some states define a

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-501(b) (2010) ('Personal identifying information' ... does not include
information, regardless of its source, contained in any federal, state or local government records or
in widely distributed media that are lawfully made available to the general public."). The three
states that do not exclude publicly available information from the definition of personal information
are Michigan, Montana, and Rhode Island.
30. IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.1(1 1) (West 2010).
31. NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-802(5) (2010).
32. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98 (West 2009).
33. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-65 (West 2009).
34. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01(2)(a) (2009).
35. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW. § 899-aa(l)(a) (McKinney 2009) (emphasis added).
36. ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.090(l) (2009).
37. HAW. REv. STAT. § 487N-1 (2009).
38. IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-2-2 (2)(a) (West 2009).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-65(a) (West 2009).
40. MASS. ANN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 1(a) (West 2009).
41. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 134.507 (West 2009). In fact, Wisconsin's data breach statute
never mentions electronic data or computer systems, but requires an organization to notify all
consumers, not merely Wisconsin residents, if it becomes aware that that someone has acquired
personal information without authorization to do so. Id.
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data breach simply as the "compromise" of a system,42 whereas other
states incorporate the extent to which the data is likely to be misused
and, in some cases, the likelihood that the misuse will lead to injury of
the consumers into the definition of data breach.43 In some cases, the
definitions incorporate a requirement that the companies investigate
where the risk of harm is unknown.
Some statutes require that companies notify consumers based solely
on "unauthorized access" to consumers' personal information or
"compromise" of personal information, whether or not the access to or
compromise of that information results in fraud, crime, or any injury to
the consumer. Because of the lack of demonstrated risk, injury, or
possibility of injury, this can be referred to as a form of "strict liability"
notification. At the other end of the scale is the risk assessment model,
in which notice is required if the unauthorized acquisition creates a risk
of harm to the consumer.
A.

The Strict Liability Model

Under the strict liability model, companies are not required to
perform a risk assessment and must provide notice whether or not there
has been an actual injury to consumers. Typically, the language found in
this type of data breach notification statute is a requirement that
companies must notify consumers on the basis of unauthorized access to
or the compromise of personal information. North Dakota defines a
security breach in the broadest possible terms, as the "unauthorized
access to" or "acquisition of" computerized data. Notification is
required whether or not the unauthorized access or acquisition of
computerized data results in the compromise of personal information. 4
California's data breach notification statute defines a breach of the
security system as an "unauthorized acquisition" of data that
"compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal
information."4 5 This type of statute requires notification in nearly all
cases where unencrypted sensitive personal data is reasonably believed
to have been acquired, whether or not there is any injury to the

42. See discussion infra Section III.A.
43. See discussion infra Section III.B.
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01(1) (2009).

45. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(d) (West 2009). A standard provision found in the California
Code and in the other data breach notification statutes is an exemption for the good faith acquisition
of personal information by an employee or agent of the person, which is considered not to be a
breach of the security of the system, provided the information is not used for a purpose unrelated to
the business or subject to further unauthorized use. See, e.g., id.
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consumer. 46 A total of thirteen states follow the strict liability model:
Arizona,47 California,4 s Delaware,4 9 Florida,5 ° Georgia,51 Illinois,5 2
Minnesota,53 Nevada,54 North Dakota," Tennessee,5 6 Texas,57 and
Washington,58 and the District of Columbia.5 9
Four states-Arizona, Florida, Nevada, and Tennesseeincorporate an element of "materiality" into the definition of a "breach
of the security system." Florida, for example, defines a data breach as
an "unauthorized acquisition" of data that "materially compromises the
60
security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information.,
However, none of these states defines a "material breach" or otherwise
provides clarity as to what constitutes a breach that "materially
compromises" personal information. Moreover, the relative gravity or
"materiality" of a breach is not a function of the number of records or
individuals whose personal information is compromised, or whether any
actual injury has occurred, but rather whether any compromised record
contains personally identifiable information (PII). Thus, a breach of a
system that contains "personal information" appears to be a primafacie
occurrence of a "material" breach.6 1 For example, if an ex-boyfriend
who hacks into a computer system and targets the personal information
of only his former girlfriend, he has effected a "material breach" of that
system. As a result, although these statutes might initially appear to
constitute a more relaxed standard, they too create a form of strict
liability for companies facing a data breach.

46. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA
BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED 37 (June
2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf.
47. ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501 (2009).
48. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2009).
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit
6, § 12B-101(a) (2009).
50. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(4) (2009).
51. See GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-911(1) (West 2009).
52. See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/5 (West 2009).
53. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61(1)(d) (West 2009).
54. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.020 (West 2009).
55. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-02 (2009).
56. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 47-18-2107(b) (West 2009).
57. See TEX. BuS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.103 (Vernon 2009).
58. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(4) (West 2009).
59. See D.C. CODE § 28-3851(1) (2009).
60. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(4) (West 2009) (emphasis added).
61. See Eric Friedberg & Michael McGowan, Lost Back-Up Tapes, Stolen Laptops and Other
Tales of DataBreach Woe, COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW, Oct. 2006.
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Arizona 62 also requires companies to undertake a reasonable
investigation to determine whether there has been a security breach.
However, the statute does not provide details on what steps satisfy the
requirements for a "reasonable" investigation.
B.

The Risk Assessment Model

In contrast to those states that require companies to notify
consumers on the basis of unauthorized access or the compromise of
personal information, twenty-four states require companies to provide
notice only if the unauthorized acquisition creates a risk of harm to the
consumer. The states that have adopted this risk assessment model have
done so using different approaches.
Six of these states-Kansas, 63 Maine, 64 Nebraska, 65 New
Hampshire, 6 6 Utah,6 7 and Wyoming 68 -- also require companies to
determine whether there has been a misuse of individuals' information.
As with Idaho and Arizona, these statues do not provide details on what
steps satisfy the requirements for a "reasonable" investigation. New
Hampshire, for example, requires an entity to "immediately determine"
whether or not misuse of individuals' personal information has occurred.
These statutes do not indicate whether notice needs to be given if there is
no indication that there has been financial injury. Nevertheless,
companies should be ready to demonstrate their reasonableness by
documenting the steps they take, the relevant expertise of the personnel
performing the investigation, and adequately and thoroughly report the
relevant findings to appropriate senior management and/or government
agencies. In short, a company that investigates whether a data breach
has or will lead to consumer injury needs to be ready to "show its work"
and report what it did to make that assessment.
Another group of states provides that if a business undertakes an
"appropriate" investigation or consults with relevant federal, state, and
local law enforcement, and "reasonably" determines that the breach has
not-and likely will not-result in harm to the individuals whose
personal information has been acquired and accessed, then the business
need not notify those individuals. These types of provisions are found in
62. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 44-7501 (2009).
63. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02(a) (2009).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1348 (2009).
65. NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-803(1) (2009).
64.

66. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:20(I)(a) (2009).
67. UTAH CODE ANN. §§13-44-102 b, -202 (West 2009).
68.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-501(a) (2009).
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the data breach statutes of Alaska,6 9 Arkansas,7 0 Florida,7' Iowa,72 and
Rhode Island.73 These states require businesses to document their
findings in writing and maintain the documentation for a stated number
of years. In Florida, for example, companies face a fine of up to $50,000
for failure to create and maintain proper documentation should they
choose not to provide notice following a breach.74 Although companies
in these ten states are not required to conduct an investigation, the laws
encourage them to do so. The statutes also provide incentives for
companies to notify federal, state, and local law enforcement of the
breach, and provide investigators and prosecutors with the opportunity to
assess the nature and extent of the compromise, and focus their limited
resources on the investigations that are the highest priority.
75 Idaho, Iowa, 76 Indiana, 77 Kansas, 78
Sixteen states-Hawaii,
Massachusetts,7 9 Montana, 0 New York,8 1 North Carolina, 2 Ohio, 3
Oklahoma, 4 Pennsylvania,85 South Carolina, 6 Virginia, 7 Wisconsin, 8
and West Virginia 9-define a "security breach" in terms of whether it
leads to a risk of injury to the consumer. Although these statutes do not
explicitly require a company to conduct an investigation into a breach,
such a determination probably requires such a review. Pennsylvania, for
example, defines "breach of the security system" as the:
Unauthorized access and acquisition of computerized data that
materially compromises the security or confidentiality of personal
information maintained by the entity as part of a database of personal

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.010(c) (2009).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105(d) (West 2009).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 5681(10)(a) (West 2009).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.1 (6) (West 2009).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-4 (2009).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(10)(a) -(b).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-1 (2009).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C. 1(6).
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-2-2 (West 2009).
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a01, -7a02 (2009).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 1(a) (West 2009).
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 30-14-1704(4)(a) (2009).
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa(c) (McKinney 2009).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-61(14) (West 2009).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19(A) (West 2009).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 3113.1 (West 2009).
73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2302 (West 2009).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-20-110(15) (2008).
VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-186.6(A) (West 2009).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98 (West 2009).
W. VA. CODE § 46A-2A-101(1) (2009).
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information regarding multiple individuals and that causes or the entity
reasonably believes has caused90 or will cause loss or injury to any
resident of this Commonwealth.

New York alone lists specific factors that an organization may
consider in determining whether consumers' personal information has
been acquired or is reasonably believed to have been acquired by an
unauthorized individual, including indications (1) that the information is
in the physical possession and control of an unauthorized person, such as
a lost or stolen computer or other device; (2) that the information has
been downloaded or copied; or (3) that the information was used by an
unauthorized person, such as fraudulent accounts opened or instances of
identity theft. 9'
C.

Blending Definitions: Risk Assessment and Strict Liability

Nine state data breach notification statutes incorporate both risk
assessment and strict liability clauses. These statutes generally start with
the premise that a company must disclose a breach. They then typically
incorporate a claw-back provision stating that notification will not be
required if the company undertakes an "appropriate investigation,"
consults with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, and
determines that the breach will not likely result in harm to the
individuals whose personal information has been acquired and accessed.
Connecticut's statute is typical:
Any person . . . shall disclose any breach of security following the

discovery of the breach to any resident of this state whose personal
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, accessed by
an unauthorized person through such breach of security.
Such notification shall not be required if, after an appropriate
investigation and consultation with relevant federal, state and local
agencies responsible for law enforcement, the person reasonably
determines that the breach will not likely result in harm to the
individuals92 whose personal information has been acquired and
accessed.

There are similar provisions in the data breach notification statutes
of Colorado,9 3 Maryland, 94 Michigan, 95 Missouri,96 New Jersey, 97
Oregon,98 and Vermont. 99
90.
91.
92.
93.

73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2302.
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW, § 899-aa(c) (McKinney 2009).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-701b(b) (West 2009).
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716 (West 2009).
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In a few states, a blend of definitions has created internal
contradictions. North Carolina defines a security breach both as
"unauthorized access to and acquisition of unencrypted and unredacted
records or data containing personal information where illegal use of the
personal information has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur or that
creates a material risk of harm to a consumer." The statute then adds:
"[a]ny incident of unauthorized access to and acquisition of encrypted
records or data containing personal information along with the
confidential process or key shall constitute a security breach." These
two standards are in conflict. The first clause includes a risk-based
analysis into whether there has been actual illegal use of data or some
other "material risk of harm." The second clause imposes strict liability
for a mere "incident of unauthorized access" to personal10 0information,
regardless of whether there is a risk of injury to consumers.
Similarly, Massachusetts' data breach statute incorporates two
different standards, the first of which is risk-based and the second of
which creates a strict liability standard. First, the statute requires an
organization to notify the Commonwealth's residents if it knows or has
reason to know of a breach of security. A breach is defined as "the
unauthorized acquisition or unauthorized use of unencrypted data, or
encrypted electronic data and the confidential process or key that is
capable of compromising the security, confidentiality, or integrity of
personal information that creates a substantial risk of identity theft or
fraud against a resident of the Commonwealth."' 0 ' In addition, however,
a company must also provide notice if it knows or has reason to know
that the personal information of such a resident was acquired or used by
an unauthorized person or used for an unauthorized purpose. 10 2
D. Conducting the Investigation
California's landmark statute, enacted in the wake of data breaches
in 2002, requires companies to notify consumers "in the most expedient
time possible and without unnecessary delay, consistent with the needs

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3504(b) (West 2009).
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 445.72(12)(1) (West 2009).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.1500 (West 2009).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (West 2009).
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.602 (West 2007).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435 (2009).
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-61(14) (West 2009).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 3(a) (West 2009).
Id.
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of law enforcement ... or any measures to determine the scope of the
breach and restore the reasonable integrity of the data system."' 3 The
states that followed California in enacting data breach notification
statutes encouraged or required companies, in various ways, to
investigate data breaches. As discussed above, some states encouraged
companies to conduct an "appropriate investigation" and consult with
law enforcement, and incorporated a provision that notification would
not be required if the investigation resulted in a determination that
consumers had not been injured.' 4 Other state statutes included
and
requirements that companies undertake their own investigations
05
report their findings to law enforcement or a regulatory authority.
The focus of the investigation varies depending on whether there is
a strict liability to report or a need to report based on a finding of
substantial risk. In strict liability states, like North Dakota, the
investigation focuses on whether a consumer's personal information has
simply been acquired and accessed. 10 6 In states that focus on substantial
risk of injury, like Massachusetts,'0 7 the focus of the investigation is on
whether the consumers had been injured by fraud or identity theft.
No statute actually defines the scope of an "adequate
investigation," details what steps a company must take, or prescribes
how a company should document the results of its investigation.
However, there are a number of questions a company should be able to
answer in order to determine what data was exposed and who was
involved in the data breach:
- Where was the compromised stolen information stored?
- How, when, and by whom was this information accessed?
- What did the perpetrators do with the data? Did they extract it? If
so, how and what did they do with it?
- With whom did the perpetrators communicate about the stolen
data, both within and outside the organization?'0 8
A digital forensic examiner can take the necessary steps to preserve
the evidence in a forensically sound manner to ensure that nothing
crucial to the investigation is altered or obliterated. Something as simple
as changing the "last accessed" dates on the compromised computer
103. CAL. CIv. CODE. § 1798.82(a) (West 2009).
104. See supralI.C.
105. Seesupra ml.B.
106. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-02 (2009).
107. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H, § 1(a) (West 2009).
108. See Eoghan Casey, Data Theft: An Ounce of Forensic Preparedness
Is Worth a Pound of Incident Response, INFO. SYS. ASS'N J., Aug. 2007, at 6, available at
https://www.issa.org/page/?p=183.
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system may make it impossible to ascertain whether an intruder gained
unauthorized access to the data at issue.
Even if evidence of illegal activity is found, failures to handle
digital evidence in a forensically sound manner can prevent an
organization from taking legal action against the culprit or making a
successful criminal referral to law enforcement.
On a practical level, there could be a real or perceived threat to the
jobs of the local IT staff, which creates a potential conflict of interest
and an incentive not to disclose all of the circumstances surrounding the
breach. Often an internal IT group may be hesitant to admit that a
breach was caused by an internal security weakness because they fear
that any blame for the vulnerability leading to the breach will be placed
at their feet. In fact, IT personnel may even be concerned that they
could be viewed as complicit suspects in the data compromise. For
example, if a company discovers that customer sales data may have been
copied illicitly from a shared file server, members of the IT department
might be reluctant to conduct a thorough investigation if they fear being
held responsible for failing to secure the file server, or if they fear that
they will be viewed as suspects because they are among the few
individuals who have administrative rights to the file server.
In short, independent digital forensic examiners can be an
important part of the successful investigation of a data breach. When
confronting the issue of how to conduct an "adequate investigation" and
prepare documentation that supports any resulting findings, a company
would be wise to consider the services of digital forensic examiners, just
as they would consider the services of outside counsel well-versed in
privacy and data breach law.
E.

Safe Harborunder FederalBanking Statutes and Other Laws

Most of the state data breach statutes provide exemptions for firms
already governed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 or,
alternatively, for procedures that are enacted pursuant to other state or
federal rules or regulations.' 0 9 These exemptions arise from the fact that

109. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501(J)(1), § 45.48.040(c) (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4110-106(a), § 4-110-106(5) (West 2009); CoL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716(2) (West 2009); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-701b(f) (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12B-103(b) (2009); D.C.
CODE § 28-3852(g) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(9)(b) (West 2009); HAW. REv. STAT. §
487N-2(a) (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51-106(2) (2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 244.9-3-3.5 (West
2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 715C.2(7XC) (West 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02(e) (2009); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1349(F) (2009); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §14-3507(c) (West 2009);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. eh. 93H, § 5 (West 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §445.72(8)(b) (West
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these other statutes have their own reporting requirements and privacy
protections. For example, Congress enacted the GLBA to ensure that
financial service providers would protect consumers' personal financial
information. Under the GLBA, financial institutions must develop and
implement data security policies that "prevent the unauthorized
disclosure of customer financial information and to deter and detect
fraudulent access to such information." Under the guidance issued
pursuant to the GLBA, a financial institution that becomes aware of
unauthorized access to personal information should conduct a reasonable
investigation promptly to determine the likelihood that the information
has been or will be misused. If the company determines that misuse of
the information has occurred or is reasonably possible, it is supposed to
notify affected consumers as soon as possible. ll
F.

Recommendation: States Should Adopt the Risk Assessment Model
Which Presents GreaterBenefitsfor the Consumer over the Strict
Liability Approach

A strict liability regime sets a hair trigger for data breach
notification. Companies send out letters to consumers even when there
is no evidence of injury, risk of injury, or possibility of injury, but
merely when there is evidence that "access to" consumers' PII occurred.
As a result, consumers receive so many data breach notification letters
that they become numb to the effect."' The form letters sent to
consumers generally provide them with no information about actual

2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61(4) (West 2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.1500.3 (West 2009);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1702(8)(b) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-804 (2009); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 603A.040(5)(a) (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 359-C:19(V) (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-65(h) (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-06 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§1349.19(F)(1) (West 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 3113.1 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 646A.602(8)(c) (West 2007); § 7307(b); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-7 (2009); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 39-1-90(J) (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107(1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-202(5)(c)
(West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435(f) (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(A) (West 2009);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2A-102(f) (West 2009); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 134.98(3)(m) (West 2009);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-502(c) (2009).
110. See Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
Information and Customer Notice, 12 C.F.R. pt. 30 App. B., Supp. A. § 1][(A) (2010); 12 C.F.R. pt.
208 App. D-2, Supp. A. § Ill(A) (2010); 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 App. F, Supp. A § 111(a) (2010); 12
C.F.R. Pt. 364, App. B, Supp. A, § III(A) (2010); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 570 App. B, Supp. A. § IIII(A); and
12 C.F.R. pt. 748, App. B § Il(A) (2010). See also U.S. GAO, PERSONAL INFORMATION, supra
note 46.
111. See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105
MICH. L. REV. 913 (2007) (arguing for determination of data security breaches and post-notification
remediation by an independent third party).
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injury or risk, nor do they provide consumers with the ability to judge
whether there is any likelihood of injury or risk.
Adopting a risk assessment model is a more efficient approach.
States and the federal government should exempt companies from the
obligation to notify individuals of a data breach if the companies (1)
undertake an appropriate investigation and "reasonably" determine that
the breach has not-and likely will not-result in harm to the
individuals whose PII has been acquired and accessed, document those
results, and maintain them for at least five years; and (2) consult with
relevant federal, state, or local law enforcement regarding their
determination that the breach has not-and likely will not-result in
harm to the individuals whose PII has been acquired and accessed.
Requiring companies to undertake a thorough investigation will protect
consumers. Directing them to liaise with law enforcement regarding a
breach would provide investigators with the information they need and
allow for increased coordination of efforts. The proposal would require
federal, state, and local law enforcement to share information they
receive from companies that had suffered data breaches; the risk is that
government agencies would find themselves so inundated with
information they would be unable to separate the wheat from the chaff.
V. WHEN TIME LIMITS ARE NOT REALLY TIME LIMITS

Several states have enacted what appear to be stringent time limits
on notification of data breaches to consumers. In reality, these purported
time limits have several elements that toll or, in some cases nullify, the
requirements written into these statutes. For example, Florida's data
breach notification statute states that, absent an investigation or the
involvement of law enforcement and the reasonable determination of no
harm, Florida organizations suffering a material breach must notify the2
affected individuals in writing, by email, or through substituted notice:"
without unreasonable delay, consistent with the legitimate needs of law
enforcement.., or subject to any measures necessary to determine the
presence, nature and scope of the breach and restore the reasonable
integrity of the system. Notification must be made no later than 45
of the breach unless otherwise
days following the determination
13
provided in this section.1

112. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(6) (West 2009).
113. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681(1)(a).
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The statute appears to require quick action based on two
complementary guidelines regarding when notice must be issued.
Specifically, the notice must be made "without unreasonable delay" but,
in any event, not later than forty-five days after there is a "determination
of a breach." '" 4 In fact, the forty-five day countdown to provide notice
is subject to either tolling or nullification under several circumstances.
First, the forty-five day countdown is tolled when the victimized
company begins taking "measures necessary to determine the presence,
nature, and scope of the breach and restore the reasonable integrity of
the system."" 5 These measures may take a substantial period of time
and no outside time limit is specified in the statute. Second, the fortyfive day countdown for notice is nullified and no notification is required
under Florida law if, after a reasonable investigation, the company
determines that the breach has not and will not likely result in harm to
whose personal information has been acquired and
the individuals
6
accessed."
Only the data breach statutes in Ohio 1 7 and Wisconsin' 18 replicate
the forty-five day limits found in Florida's data breach statute. Ohio's
statute makes the rigorous time constraints "subject to the legitimate
needs of law enforcement, and consistent with any measures necessary
to determine the scope of the breach, including which residents' personal
information was accessed and acquired, and to restore the reasonable
integrity of the data system." ' 1 9 However, the conjunctive between these
two clauses means that companies in Ohio need to coordinate with law
enforcement from the onset of the investigation of a data breach to
ensure that the forty-five day notification requirement is tolled.
Wisconsin's statute, in contrast, posits that the only law enforcement
exceptions to the forty-five day rule must20be related to the protection of
an investigation or to homeland security.
Another group of thirty states require a company to provide notice
in the "most expedient time possible," "without unreasonable delay," or
"as soon as possible."' 2' In the seven states that require companies to

114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.5681 (10)(a).
117. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349. 19(B)(2) (West 2009) (emphasis added).
118. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98 (West 2009).
119. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19(B)(2).
120. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 134.98.
121. The thirty states that require a company to provide notice in the "most expedient time
possible" and "without unreasonable delay" or "as soon as possible" are Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §
45.48.010 (2009); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105(d) (West 2009); California, CAL. Civ.
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undertake investigations, companies generally must first conduct a
"reasonable and prompt" investigation to determine the likelihood that
personal information has been or will be misused; 22
if so, they must then
provide notice in the most expedient time possible.1
A.

Penalties

Consumers in California, 123 Hawaii,t 24 New Hampshire,t 25 North
Carolina, 26 Washington,127 and the District of Columbia 28 have an
explicit private right of action under their state data breach statutes.
Companies that do not comply with the statute face civil penalties
ranging from $500 a violation in Maine 29 to a maximum of $750,000 in
Michigan, 30 and a range of penalties in between.13 1 In twenty-six states,

CODE § 1798.82(a) (West 2009); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6176(2) (West 2009);
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-701b(b) (West 2008); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 12B-102(A) (2009); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 28-3852(a) (2009); Georgia, GA. CODE
ANN. § 10-1-912(a) (West 2009); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-2(a) (2009); Illinois, 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/10(a) (West 2009); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-3-3 (West 2009);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:3074 (2009); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
93H, § 3 (West 2009); Michigan, MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 445.72(12)(4) (West 2009);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61(l)(a) (West 2009); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. §
407.1500.2(3) (West 2009); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704(1) (2009); Nevada, NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.220(1) (West 2009); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163(12)(a)
(West 2009); New York, N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa(2) (McKinney 2009); North Carolina, N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-65 (West 2009); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-02 (2009);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 3113(3) (West 2009); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
646A.604 (West 2007); Pennsylvania, 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2303(a) (West 2009); Rhode Island, R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-3 (2009); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107(d) (West 2009); Texas,
TEx. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.103(b) (Vernon 2009); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-202(2)
(West 2009); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435(b)(1) (2009); and Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.255.010(1) (West 2009).
122. The seven states in which states first must conduct a "reasonable and prompt"
investigation are Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501 (2009); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. §
28-51-105 (2009); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-7a02 (2009); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1348 (2009); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-803(1) (West 2009); New Hampshire,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:20(I)(a) (2009); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-501(a)
(2009).
123. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84 (West 2009).
124. Id.
125. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:21 (2009).
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-65-(i) (West 2009).
127. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 19.255(10)(a) (West 2009).
128. D.C. CODE § 28-3853(a) (2009).
129. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1349 (2009).
130. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 445.72(13)-(14) (West 2009).
131. In Arizona, companies face civil penalties up to $10,000, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 447501(H) (2009); in Hawaii, civil penalties up to $2500 for each violation, see HAW. REV. STAT. §
487N-3 (2009); Idaho, fimes of up to $25,000 per breach, see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51-107

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol4/iss2/2

22

Lesemann: One More Unto the Breach

ONE MORE UNTO THE BREACH

2010]

the attorney general may institute suit for actual damages or injunctive
relief against organizations or individuals that violate the data breach
statute.132
B.

Enforcement and Litigation under the Data Breach Statutes

In the first five years after the first data breach statute was passed in
California in 2002, there were relatively few state or federal complaints
filed under the data breach notification statutes, especially in light of the
number of data breaches reported. The early suits arising out of the data
breaches were focused on contract or tort rather than violation of the
data breach notification statutes themselves. For example, the Office of
the Massachusetts Attorney General led a multi-state investigation into
the security breach reported by the TJX Companies (TJX), the parent
company of TJ Maxx, Marshalls, HomeGoods, and A.J. Wright stores.
The FTC filed suit as well, alleging that TJX failed to prevent
unauthorized access to personal information on its computer networks
and that these failures allowed a hacker to exploit vulnerabilities and
obtain tens of millions of credit and debit payment cards used at the
retailer's stores, as well as personal information relating to
approximately 455,000 consumers who returned merchandise without
receipts. 133 The TJX breach affected information regarding credit and
debit card sales transactions in TJX's stores in the United States,

(2009); Indiana, civil penalties up to $150,000 per deceptive act; see IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4.9-4-2
(West 2009).
132. The twenty-six jurisdictions in which state Attorneys General have authority to bring suits
for damages or injunctive relief are Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.080(a) (2009); Arkansas, ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-109-108 (West 2009); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6176(4) (West 2009);
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-701b(g) (West 2009); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 12B-106 (2009); Illinois, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/20 (West 2009); Iowa, IOWA CODE
ANN. § 715C.2(8) (West 2009); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02(g) (2009); Louisiana, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 51:3075 (2009); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1349.2 (West 2009);
Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3508; Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch.
93H, § 6 (West 2009); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61.6 (2009); Missouri, MO. ANN. §
407.1500.4 (West 2009); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-806 (2009); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 603A.920 (West 2009); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-166 (West 2009); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-65(i) (West 2009); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-0307 (2009); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19() (West 2009); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 74, § 3113.3 (West 2009); Pennsylvania, 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2309 (West 2009); Tennessee,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2106 (West 2009); Texas, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.201
(Vernon 2009); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 14-44-301(4) (West 2009); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 2435(g) (2009); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (West 2009); West Virginia, W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 46A-2A-104 (West 2009); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-502(f) (2009).
July
29,
2008),
(filed
C-4227
Inc.,
No.
133. TJX
Companies,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723055/080801tjxcomplaint.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
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Canada, and Puerto Rico during 2003, as well as such information for
these stores from mid-May through December 2006.134 TJX also faced
numerous individual and class action suits filed by consumers across the
country. 3 5 Both the private litigation and the public enforcement
actions were focused on claims arising under TJX's failure to protect
consumers' personally identifiable information; there were no claims
that the company had failed to notify the victims upon the discovery of
the breach.
In June 2009, TJX settled with the multi-state group of attorneys
general and agreed to pay $9.75 million to the states, $5.5 million of
which is to be dedicated to data protection and consumer protection
efforts by the states and $1.75 million is for reimbursement of the states'
costs and fees. The remaining $2.5 million of the settlement will fund a
Data Security Trust that will be used by the state attorneys general for
policy efforts in the field of data security and protecting consumers'
personal information. 36 The company's settlement with the FTC
requires that it establish and maintain a comprehensive security program
reasonably designed to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity
of personal information it collects from or about consumers. 37 To settle

134.

Jaikumar Vijayan, TJX Data Breach: At 45.6M Card Numbers, It's the Biggest Ever,

COMPUTERWORLD,

Mar.

29,

2007,

available

at

www.computerworld.com/s/article/9014782/TJX data-breachAt_45.6M-card-numbers it s the
biggest ever?taxonomyld= 17&pageNumber= 1.
135. The actions filed against TJX, the parent company of TJ Maxx, include Robinson v. TJX
Companies, Inc. No. 07-cv-02139 (N.D. I11.filed Apr. 17, 2007), No. 07-cv- 11485 (D. Mass. filed
Aug. 10, 2007); Arians v. TJX Companies, Inc., No. 07-cv-10769 (D. Mass. filed Apr. 18, 2007);
Mass. Bankers Ass'n v. TJX Companies, Inc., No. 07-cv-10791 (D. Mass. filed Apr. 25, 2007);
Wardrop v. TJX Companies, Inc., No. 07-cv-00430 (W.D. Mich. filed Apr. 30, 2007), No. 07-cv11495 (D. Mass. filed Aug. 13, 2007); Taliaferro v. TJX Companies, Inc., No. 07-cv-00388 (S.D.
Ohio filed May 17, 2007), No. 07-cv-1 1484 (D. Mass. filed Aug. 10, 2007); Lack v. TJX
Companies, Inc. No. 07-cv-00233 (E.D. Tex. filed May 23, 2007), No. 07-cv-1 1496 (Mass. D. filed
Aug. 13, 2007); Lamb v. TJX Companies, Inc., No. 07-cv-00379 (W.D. Mo. filed May 22, 2007),
No. 07-cv-1 1504 (D. Mass. filed Aug. 14, 2007); Roberts v. TJX Companies, Inc., No. 07-cv-02887
(N.D. Ill. filed May 23, 2007), No. 07-cv- 11489 (D. Mass. filed Aug. 10, 2007); and Mace v. TJX
Companies, Inc., (D. Mass.). The Mace litigation has been administratively designated as the lead
case with respect to all actions pending in the District of Massachusetts, which have been
consolidated. In re TJX Companies Retail Sec. Breach Litig., No. 07-cv-10 162 (D. Mass. filed Jan.
29, 2007).
136. News Release from the Office of New Mexico Attomey General Gary King, AG King
Approves
Data
Breach
Settlement
for
NM
(June
23,
2009),
http://www.nmag.gov/Articles/newsArticle.aspx?ArticlelD=718#FullArticle (last visited Apr. 23,
2010).
137. TJX Co., Inc., No. 072 3055
(agreement containing consent order),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723055/080327agreement.pdf (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
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the class action suits, TJX offered vouchers, cash, credit monitoring,
38
identity theft insurance, and reimbursement to eligible class members.1
However, starting in 2008 a number of recent large breaches have
spawned suits under data breach statutes in federal courts around the
country as well as an increasing number of actions by state attorneys
general. The data breach at Countrywide Financial, the holding
company for Countrywide Home Loans, has thus far given rise to six
class actions filed in federal district courts across the country. One of
the six was filed in the Southern District of Florida and alleges a
violation of the Florida data breach notification statute. 39 The United
States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated the six
cases and transferred them to the Western District of Kentucky for
pretrial proceedings. 40 In addition, the Connecticut Attorney General
announced in September 2008 that as part of its ongoing investigation it
was seeking more details about the threat to Connecticut consumers,
confirmation that the company would provide free credit monitoring and
freezes, and a guarantee that consumers
would be compensated for
14 1
losses associated with the breach.
In 2007, the New York Attorney General's Office announced a
settlement with CS Stars LLC, a Chicago-based claims management
company for failing to notify 540,000 New York consumers for seven
weeks after a breach in 2006 in contravention of the statute's
requirement that notice be made "immediately following discovery."
The company agreed to comply with the law, ensure that proper
notifications be made in the event of the future, implement more
extensive practices relating to the security of private information, and
pay the Attorney General's office $60,000 for costs related to the
42
investigation.

1

138. See Legal Notice for Eligible Class Members of In re TJX Companies Retail Security
Breach Litigation, www.idtheftl0l.net/articles/Legal-Notice TJMaxxSummary.pdf (last visited

Apr. 23, 2010).
139. Goldman v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 08-cv-61349, 2008 WL 4236995 (S.D. Fla. filed
Aug 22, 2008).
140. In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:08-MD-01998,

2009 WL 5184352, slip op. (W.D. Ky. Dec. 22, 2009).
141. Press Release from the Connecticut Attorney General's Office, Attorney General
Demands Details, Consumer Protections For Approximately 2 Million Exposed by Countrywide
Breach (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2795&Q=422688 (last visited Apr.
23, 2010).
142. News Release from the New York Attorney General Andrew M. Cuomo's Office, Cuomo

Obtains First Agreement for Violation of Security Breach Notification Law (Apr. 26, 2007),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2007/apr/apr26a_07.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
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In the wake of the Heartland Payment Systems breach of 2009,
plaintiffs seeking class action status have filed suit alleging contract
violations as well as failure to promptly notify consumers of the data
breach in violation of New Jersey law. 143 The plaintiffs in the Express
Scripts class action cited eleven data breach notification statutes, noting
that Missouri, the home of the St. Louis-based pharmacy benefit
management company that suffered the breach, did not then have such a
requirement. 44
RBS WorldPay also has to contend with a federal district court
action filed in the Northern District of Georgia seeking class action
status and alleging a violation of Georgia's data breach notification
statute.145 In addition, Wackenhut Corporation, the security company, is
contending with a suit filed in 2008 in Tennessee Circuit Court alleging
that it6 failed to notify consumers of a data breach as required by state
14
law.
The Indiana Attorney General's Office recently resolved suits
brought with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Office
of Civil Rights against two pharmacy chains, CVS and Walgreens,
which involved data breach complaints alleging that customers' medical
information was improperly discarded in trash bins outside of the
stores. 47 The actions, however, were brought under HIPAA, not the
Indiana data breach notification statute.
The rise of complaints alleging violations of data breach
notification statutes-both by state attorneys general and by private
litigants in federal court-should be a wake up call for lawyers and their
clients. As the incidence of reported data breaches increases, along with
the number of complaints that companies have failed to comply with the
requirements under the statute, liability-in terms of penalties and
judgments-will rise as well. Statutes in twenty-four states incorporate
provisions that allow companies to take "any measures necessary to
determine the presence, nature, and scope of the breach and restore the

143. Sansom v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 2009 WL 217497 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 23, 2009).
144. Amburgy, v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (granting
defendant's motion to dismiss because plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim, and plaintiff failed
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted).
145. Irwin v. RBS WorldPay, Inc., 2009 WL 412516,412516 (N.D. Ga. filed Feb 05, 2009).
146. Throckmorton v. Mejro. Gov't of Nashville, 2008 WL 227312 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. filed Jan
04, 2008).
147. Press Release from the Indiana Attorney General's Office, CVS, Walgreen Settle with
2009),
(Jul.
13,
General,
InsideIndianaBusiness.com
Indiana
Attorney
www.insideindianabusiness.com/newsitem.asp?ID=36573#middle (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
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reasonable integrity of the system"; 14 ' any time limits are tolled while
the company is undertaking such an investigation. Seven states also
require companies to undertake a "reasonable" investigation to
undertake the scope of the breach. 49 Accordingly, when companies face
a data breach-and the prospect of litigation-it would be in their best
interest to consider the stakes at risk and how they will approach such an
investigation.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: TOWARD A FEDERAL DATA BREACH
NOTIFICATION STANDARD

A.

Overview: Breach Notification under the HITECHAct

The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health (HITECH Act), enacted as part of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009,150 includes provisions designed to advance
the use of health information technology while strengthening privacy
and security protections for that information. The HITECH Act required
the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS" or
"Department") to issue interim final regulations for breach notification
by entities subject to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") and their business associates. The statute also
directed the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission") to
adopt within 180 days of enactment of the statute a rule implementing
the breach notification requirements for vendors and third-party service
providers of personal health records (PHRs), 15 ' such as online
repositories of health information that individuals can create to track
52
their medical visits and prescription information.

148. See supra Section III.B.
149. See supra Section III.B.
150. Health Information Technology, Title XIII, American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of
2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 2009));
Medicare and Medicaid Health Information Technology, Title IV, id.at 467 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 1395w-4 et seq.).
151. § 13407(g)(1), id.at 270-71 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 17937(g)(1)). The statute
addresses only breach notification with respect to PHRs voluntarily created by individuals; it does
not address electronic health records more generally, such as those created for patients by hospitals
or doctors.
152. The statute defines PHRs as electronic records "on an individual that can be drawn from
multiple sources and that is managed, shared and controlled by or primarily for the individual." §
13400(11), id.
at 259 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 17921(11)).
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On August 24, 2009, HHS issued an Interim Final Rule with
Request for Comments 53 entitled "Breach Notification for Unsecure
Protected Health Information" to require notification of breaches of
unsecured PHI. 154 The next day the FTC issued its Final Breach
Notification Rule, which required PHRs and related entities to notify
consumers when the security of their individually identifiable health
information has been breached.155 In general, the HHS regulations apply
to HIPAA-covered entities-health plans, health care providers, and
their business associates-and the FTC regulations apply to vendors of
PHRs and their third-party service providers." 5 6
B.

ProtectedHealth Information andPersonalHealth Records

The HITECH Act requires covered entities and business associates
to provide notification following the breach of unsecured protected
health information (PHI). PHI, in turn, is defined by HIPAA's Privacy
Rule as "individually identifiable health information held or transmitted
in any form or medium by these HIPAA-covered entities and business
associates, whether electronic, paper or oral.'
The Privacy Rule
defines "individually identifiable health information" as information,
including demographic data that relates to:
- The individual's past, present or future physical or mental health
or condition,
- The provision of health care to the individual, or
The past, present, or future payment for the provision of health care
to the individual,

153. Congress required HHS to issue regulations as "interim final regulations" within 180 days
after the enactment of the Recovery Act on February 23, 2009. § 13402(j), id at 263 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 179320)). Based on the statutory directive and the time frame, the Department decided
to waive the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act and to proceed
with the interim final rule along with Request for Comments. HHS Breach Notification for
Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 Fed. Reg. 42740-41 (Aug. 24, 2009) (to be codified at
45 C.F.R. pt. 160, 164).
154. Id.at42740.
155. See FTC Health Breach Notification Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 318.1 (2010).
156. The FTC adopted a provision specifying that its rule "does not apply to HIPAA-covered

entities, or to any other entity to the extent that it engages in activities as a business associate of a
HIPAA-covered entity." Id. at § 318.1(a).
157. HHS Definitions, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2010). The general principle underlying the
Privacy Rule is that a covered entity may not use or disclose PHI except either (1) as the Privacy
Rule permits or requires or (2) as the individual who is the subject of the information (or the
individual's personal representative) authorizes in writing. Id.
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And that identifies the individual or for which there is 8a
reasonable basis to believe can be used to identify the individual.1
Individually identifiable health information also includes many
common identifiers, e.g., name, address, birth date, and social security
number.'5 9
As required by the HITECH Act, HHS promulgated the Interim
Final Rule, which requires organizations to provide notice following a
breach of unsecured PHI. 60
Under the regulation, disclosure of
individually identifiable health information that is not PHI would not
qualify as a "breach" for purposes of this rule, although the Department
noted that a company should consider whether it has notification
requirements under other laws. 16 1 In the Interim Final Rule, the
Department clarified that the term "unauthorized" meant an
impermissible use or disclosure
of protected health information under
162
the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
-

C.

Definition of "Breach"
Section 13400(1)(A) of the HITECH Act defines "breach" as
unauthorized acquisition, access, use or disclosure of protected health
information which compromises the security or privacy of the
protected health information except where an unauthorized person to
whom such information is disclosed would not reasonably have been
able to retain such information. 163

The Act also provides exceptions to the definition of "breach" for
certain circumstances involving inadvertent acquisition, access, or use of
PHI by employees and agents of covered entities or business associates
where the information is not further acquired, accessed, used, or
disclosed. 64

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. HHS Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 Fed. Reg.
42740, 42740 (Aug. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160 & 164)..
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Health Information Technology, Title XIII, American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of
2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 2009));
Medicare and Medicaid Health Information Technology, Title IV, id.at 467 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 1395w-4 et seq.); § 13400(1)(a), id.
at 258-59 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 17921(1)(a)).
164. § 13402(a) & (b), id.
at 260 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 17932(a) & (b)); § 13400(1)(B), id.
at 258 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1792 1(1)(B)).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

29

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 4 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 2

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[4:203

The HHS Regulations noted that the agency had "consulted closely
with the FTC in the development of these regulations" and were
cognizant of worries that organizations that could fall under "different
and inconsistent regulatory schemes.', 65 The two agencies charged with
promulgating regulations under this Act, however, have come up with
separate-and conflicting-definitions of "breach." HHS relies on a
risk assessment standard while the FTC uses a blended approach that
incorporates both elements of strict liability and risk assessment. HHS
defines a "breach" as the "acquisition, access, use or disclosure of
protected health information in a manner not permitted under subpart E
of this part which compromises the security or privacy of the protected
health information."' 166 For an acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of
PHI to constitute a breach, it must constitute a violation of the Privacy
Rule. For example, the Interim Final Rule notes that uses or disclosures
that impermissibly involve more than the minimum necessary
information
in violation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule 167 may qualify as
68
breaches.1

As noted above, the HITECH Act defines a security breach in terms
of an "acquisition which... compromises the security or privacy of the
protected health information.' 69 In the Interim Final Rule, the
Department agreed with comments that noted that this language
"contemplates that covered entities will perform some type of risk
assessment to determine if there is a risk of harm to the individual, and
therefore, if a breach has occurred.' 17 0 Thus, the Department decided
that the statute "encompassed a harm threshold" and "clarified" that a
breach that "compromises the security or privacy of the protected health
information" means that it "poses a significant risk of financial,
reputational, or other harm to the individual.''
The Interim Final
Rule-as opposed to the statute-therefore contains an explicit
requirement that organizations facing a data breach conduct an
investigation to determine where there is a significant risk of harm to the
individual(s) as a result of the impermissible use or disclosure:

165.

HHS Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 Fed. Reg.

42740,42743 (Aug. 24, 2009).
166. Id.
167.

HHS Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health Information: General Rules, 45 C.F.R. §

164.502(b) (2010); HHS Other Requirements Relating to Uses and Disclosures of Protected Health
Information, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(d) (2010).
168. Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 Fed. Reg. at 42743.
169. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 17921(l)(a) (West 2009).
170. Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 Fed. Reg. at 42744.
171.

Id.
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Breach means the acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected
health information in a manner not permitted under subpart E of this
part which compromises the security or privacy of the protected health
information.
(1)(i) For purposes of this definition, compromises the security or
privacy of the protected health information means poses a significant
172

risk of financial, reputational, or other harm to the individual.

The FTC, on the other hand, took a different approach. Where
HHS has read a requirement of a "risk assessment" into the definition of
breach, the FTC has adopted a rebuttable presumption that acquisition of
The
information includes access to identifiable information.
Commission defined "breach of security" to mean, with respect to
unsecured PHR identifiable health information as:
acquisition of such information without the authorization of the
individual. Unauthorized acquisition will be presumed to include
unauthorized access to unsecured PHR identifiable health information
unless the vendor of personal health records, PHR related entity, or
third party service provider that experienced the breach has reliable
evidence that there has not been, or could not
173 reasonably have been,
unauthorized acquisition of such information.
The first part of the FTC's definition defines a security breach in
the broadest sense-as an acquisition of PHI "without authorization."
The second clause, however, includes a claw-back in which the
organization will not have to notify individuals if it provides "reliable"
evidence that the unauthorized acquisition has not included unauthorized
access to identifiable information. Although the regulation does not
explicitly require organizations to undertake an investigation, the
definitions adopted by both the FTC and HHS encourage them to do
so. 174

D.

Encryption

The HITECH Act requires organizations to provide notice only if a
breach involves PHI that is "unsecured.' 17 1 Under the HHS regulation,
"unsecured protected health information" means protected health
information that is not rendered unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable
172.
173.
174.
175.
123 Stat.

HHS Definitions, 45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (2010).
FTC Health Breach Notification Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 318.2(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
See Section I1I.B and cites therein.
See American Recovery & Reinvestment Act of 2009, §13402(h)(2), Pub. L. No. 111-5,
115,262 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 17921(h)(2) (West 2009)).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010

31

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 4 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 2

AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[4:203

to unauthorized individuals through the use of a technology or
methodology specified by the Secretary in the guidance issued under
section 13402(h)(2) of Public Law 111-5 on the HHS Web site.'76 The
definition of "unsecured" in the FTC's Rule similarly relies on the
protection of information through technologies identified by the
Secretary of HHS.17 7 This approach allows the Department to update its
guidance to companies quickly as encryption technologies improve.
E.

Time Line for Notification

Under both the HHS Interim Final Rule and the FTC's Final Rule,
a company must send the required notification "without unreasonable
delay" and in no case later than sixty calendar days after the date the
breach was discovered. 178 The only exception to this time frame is
when law enforcement requests a delay. 179 A breach is treated as
"discovered" on the first day the breach is known to the company or
third party vendor 180 or would have been known to the company had it
exercised reasonable diligence. 18 ' Thus, "the time period for breach
notification begins when the incident is first known, not when the
investigation of the incident is complete, even if it is initially182unclear
whether the incident constitutes a breach as defined in this rule.
F.

Notification of Breach

In addition to the requirement that a covered entity must notify each
individual whose unsecured PHI has been, or is reasonably believed to
have been breached, if a breach involves more than 500 residents of a
state or jurisdiction, the organization must notify "prominent media
outlets serving the state or jurisdiction" without unreasonable delay and
83
in no case later than sixty calendar days after discovery of a breach.'
Regardless of the location of the victims, if the breach affects fewer than
176. 45 C.F.R. §164.402(2)(iii). The guidance is published on the HHS web site at
www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understandinglcoveredentities/federaregisterbreachrfi.pdf.

177. 16 C.F.R. § 318.2(e)(2)(i).
178. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404(b); 16 C.F.R. § 318.4(a).
179. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.412; 16 CFR § 318.4(c).
180.

45 C.F.R. § 164.404(a)(2); 16 C.F.R. § 318.3(c).

In addition, the HHS regulation

specifies that the knowledge of a breach by a workforce member or other agent-other than the
person committing the breach-is imputed to the covered entity itself. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404(a)(2).
181. 45 C.F.R. § 164.404(a)(2).
182. HHS Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 Fed. Reg.
42740,42749 (Aug. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160).

183. HHS Notification to Media, 45 CFR § 164.406 (2010); FTC Methods of Notice, 16 C.F.R.
§ 318.5(b) (2010).
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500 individuals, then the covered entity must provide notice to either the
FTC or HHS, as applicable. 184 If the breach affects fewer than 500
individuals, the organization must maintain a log or other similar
documentation and provide that information to the Department or the
Commission no later than sixty days after the end of the calendar year.1 85
Congress' enactment of a federal data breach notification
requirement for PHI is an important first step toward a rationalization of
data security standards. However, HHS and the FTC have taken the
same statutory language and promulgated separate and conflicting
definitions of a security breach, with the former based on a risk
assessment while the latter incorporates elements of both strict liability
and risk assessment. Maintaining both definitions could set up the very
vowed they
"different and inconsistent regulatory schemes" the 8agencies
6
would avoid through consultation and coordination.
Congress should now take the next step and enact a statute that
applies to consumers' PH, as defined by California's statute, and
incorporates a risk assessment approach to data breach notifications,
rather than strict liability. The hair trigger set in the strict liability
models has caused so many disclosure letters to be sent to so many
consumers-with consumers often receiving letters from multiple
companies regarding the same breach-that people have become numb
to the effect.' 87 The form letters generally do not provide consumers
with information about any genuine injury or risk, nor do they provide
the consumers with the ability to judge whether there is any likelihood of
injury or risk.
Congress should enact a statute that provides that notification is not
required if, after an appropriate investigation within a reasonable
timeframe-not to exceed sixty calendar days-and after consultation
with relevant federal, state, or local agencies responsible for law
enforcement, the company determines that there is no reasonable
likelihood of financial harm to the consumers whose personal
information has been acquired as a result of the breach. The company
should be required to document the results of its investigation and retain
those records for at least five years, with a fine of $50,000 for failure to
maintain those records.

184. HHS Notification to Secretary, 45 C.F.R. § 164.408(a) (2010); 16 CFR § 318.5(c).
185. 45 C.F.R. § 164.408(c); 16 C.F.R. § 318.5(c).
186. HHS Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 Fed. Reg.
42740,42740 (Aug. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160 & 164).
187. See Schwartz & Janger, supra note 111 (arguing for determination of data security
breaches and post-notification remediation by an independent third party).
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Waitingfor Godot:'88 Steps for State Legislatures,Enforcement
Agencies, and Companies

An overarching federal data breach notification standard may not
happen soon. In the meantime, there are a number of steps that state and
local legislatures and enforcement agencies can take. First, the five
states that do not have data breach notification statutes-Alabama,
Kentucky, Mississippi, New Mexico, and South Dakota-should enact
them immediately. As laid out above, the most efficient, consumeroriented approach is a statute that encompasses a risk-assessment
definition of "data breach."
Second, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors should
determine if the statutes in their jurisdictions have "reasonable
investigation" and cooperation provisions that toll notification to
consumers. If so, these agencies should ensure that companies are aware
of these provisions and work toward taking full advantage of the ability
to find out about breaches as early as possible.
Third, data breach statutes throughout the country present a web of
conflicting obligations for companies and their lawyers that may
potentially expose organizations to millions of dollars in fines and civil
liability if obligations under the laws are ignored or misunderstood. A
unified data breach notification statute-either a model state law or a
federal statute-will minimize the burden on the private sector.
Companies with a multi-state or Internet presence currently must adhere
to the most restrictive law or wrestle with conflict between the
jurisdictions where it does business. Many, if not most, of the state
statutes allow companies to forego notifying individuals whose personal
information may have been compromised if the company "reasonably"
determines that the breach did not and likely will not result in harm to
those individuals. Although the statutes do not provide detail on what
steps satisfy the requirements for a "reasonable" investigation, most do
require the companies to document what steps they have taken and to
maintain the records for a set period of time. Companies that undertake
a "reasonable investigation" face extraordinarily high stakes in terms of
potential fines and risk to reputation and should consider whether to rely
on untrained personnel or individuals with potential conflicts of interest
to investigate the origin, nature, and extent of the breach, and to provide
a determination as to whether the breach resulted in harm to individuals
whose personal information has been compromised.
188.

SAMUEL BECKETT, WAITING FOR GODOT: A TRAGICOMEDY IN TWO ACTS (MY: Grove

Press 1994) (1956).
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Enactment of a federal data breach notification statute can provide
enforcement authority to state attorneys general and a federal law
enforcement authority, such as the U.S. Department of Justice or the
Federal Trade Commission. This model has worked well with the
Telemarketing Sales Rule 1 89 and the rule regulating the "pay-per-call"
industry.1 90 Both rules provide authority to the federal government and
the states, which typically have the most experience combating such
problems. Ultimately, the private sector and consumers will benefit
from a unified data breach notification law as well as multiple enforcers
of that statute.

189. FTC Actions by States and Private Persons, 16 C.F.R. § 310.7 (2010).
190. FTC Billing and Collection for Pay-Per-Call Services, 16 C.F.R. § 308.7 (2010).
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